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With the continuous advancement of the deepening reform of the medical security system, the medical insurance payment method, as an important part of it, has become the focus of the reform. As one of the main types of innovative payment methods, payment for performance combines payment and medical service quality to improve the efficiency of medical and health services and patient satisfaction. In order to accelerate the clinical application of new medical technologies, improve patients′ access to innovative technologies, and reduce the disease economic burden of patients, Shanghai has carried out a pilot reform of paying for performance for three new technologies including Cryoablation in the treatment of cancer, Da Vinic Robotic Surgical System and Plasma MicroRNA Panel detection. Through multiple rounds of expert consultation and on-the-spot investigation, the positive detection rate, complication rate and tumor reduction rate were finally determined as the performance evaluation indicators of the three technologies, and the corresponding payment standards were defined. The pilot reform in Shanghai could provide reference for other regions to carry out performance based payment.
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Resumo É considerável a escala da transformação necessária para alcançar todos os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS). O terceiro ODS (ODS3), explicitamente, está relacionado com a saúde, visando assegurar vidas saudáveis e bem-estar para todos, em todas as idades. Os Cuidados de Saúde Primários (CSP), neste contexto, constituem a espinha dorsal de um sistema de saúde que pode melhorar a saúde das pessoas, reduzir a despesa e diminuir as desigualdades. Uma forte orientação do sistema para os CSP deve ser temporalmente estável, desde a sua reformulação. Esta análise utiliza o estudo de caso instrumental. Este tipo de estudo de caso oferece a oportunidade de aprender sobre os acontecimentos. Analisamos e debatemos 13 indicadores, comparando ao longo do tempo, os resultados obtidos pela tipologia de unidades de saúde existentes em Portugal: USF-A, USF-B, UCSP, UCSP-M. Os resultados demonstrados são discrepantes, quando se comparam as USF e as UCSP e podem contribuir para o aprofundamento das desigualdades de acesso. Este é um problema que se relaciona com a governação clínica e não com o modelo de unidade de saúde. O empoderamento das coordenações e a melhoria de eficácia da gestão intermédia é aqui fundamental.
Abstract The scale of transformation required to achieve all Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is considerable. The third SDG (SDG3) is explicitly health-related to ensure healthy lives and well-being for all, at all ages. Primary care (PHC), in this context, is the backbone of a health system that can improve people's health, reduce spending and inequalities. A robust system orientation towards PHC must be temporally stable since its reformulation. This analysis uses an instrumental case study. This type of case study provides the opportunity to learn about events. We analyzed and debated 13 indicators, comparing over time, the results obtained by the type of Portuguese health units: USF-A, USF-B, UCSP, UCSP-M. The results show some discrepancies when comparing USFs and UCSPs and may contribute to the deterioration of access inequalities. This is a problem related to clinical governance and not the health unit model. Empowering coordination and improving the effectiveness of middle management is crucial.
Subject(s)
Humans , Primary Health Care/organization & administration , Health Status Indicators , Efficiency, Organizational , Family Practice/organization & administration , Sustainable Development , Goals , Portugal , Primary Health Care/economics , Reimbursement, Incentive/economics , Time Factors , Family Health/economics , Family Practice/economics , Health Promotion/organization & administrationABSTRACT
@#Objective: This study was conducted to investigate the challenges faced in the implementation of the pay-for-performance system in Iran’s family physician program. Study design: Qualitative. Place and duration of study: The study was conducted with 32 key informants at the family physician program at the Tabriz University of Medical Sciences between May 2018 and June 2018. Method: This is a qualitative study. A purposeful sampling method was used with only one inclusion criterion for participants: five years of experience in the family physician program. The researchers conducted 17 individual and group non-structured interviews and examined participants’ perspectives on the challenges faced in the implementation of the pay-for-performance system in the family physician program. Content analysis was conducted on the obtained data. Results: This study identified 7 themes, 14 sub-themes, and 46 items related to the challenges in the implementation of pay-for-performance systems in Iran’s family physician program. The main themes are: workload, training, program cultivation, payment, assessment and monitoring, information management, and level of authority. Other sub-challenges were also identified. Conclusion: The study results demonstrate some notable challenges faced in the implementation of the pay-for-performance system. This information can be helpful to managers and policymakers.
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Pay-for-performance(P4P) is the third stage of payment evolution in the United States. As of 2010, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services launched a series of P4P programs, including hospital value-based purchasing(HVBP) program. This paper introduced the background and eligibility of HVBP in the United States, focusing on the contents and calculation methods of HVBP as references for the reform of payment methods in China.
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Resumo A epidemiologia desempenha um papel estratégico neste estágio do ciclo de política, contribuindo para o estabelecimento de metas, alocação de recursos e uso de sistemas de informação. Em 2009, a Secretaria Municipal de Saúde do Rio de Janeiro iniciou uma reforma do modelo de atenção, utilizando como principal influência o conceito de Atenção Primária em Saúde. Este estudo avalia a tendência de indicadores selecionados do "pay-for-performance" que mensuram o processo de cuidado em saúde na APS da cidade. Estudo de painéis repetidos, a partir dos registros administrativos e clínicos dos prontuários eletrônicos no período de 2012 a 2016. Foram escolhidos sete indicadores que analisaram o desempenho longitudinal dentro da meta estabelecida, entre aqueles que representam acesso, longitudinalidade, coordenação do cuidado - atributos da APS, assim como outras características dos serviços como desempenho assistencial e eficiência econômica. Este estudo demonstrou que a descentralização da gestão para níveis mais próximos do usuário é potencialmente exitoso para o registro de dados clínicos, caso seja realizado um adequado monitoramento dos indicadores, auditorias clínicas frequentes e realizado periodicamente um "feedback" aos profissionais de saúde com os dados e indicadores acompanhados.
Abstract Epidemiology plays a strategic role at this stage of the policy cycle, contributing to goal setting, resource allocation and use of information systems. In 2009, the Municipal Health Secretariat of Rio de Janeiro initiated a reform of the health care model under the main influence the Primary Health Care concept. This study evaluates the trend of selected pay-for-performance indicators that measure the health care process in the city's PHC. This a study on repeated panels, from the administrative and clinical records of electronic medical records in the period from 2012 to 2016. We selected seven indicators that analyzed longitudinal performance within the established goal, among those that represent access, longitudinality, coordination of care - APS attributes, as well as other characteristics of the services, such as care performance and economic efficiency. This study demonstrated that management decentralization to levels closer to the user is potentially successful for the recording of clinical data under an adequate monitoring of indicators, regular clinical audits and feedback to health professionals, along with data and indicators monitoring.
Subject(s)
Humans , Primary Health Care/organization & administration , Reimbursement, Incentive , Delivery of Health Care/organization & administration , Electronic Health Records/statistics & numerical data , Primary Health Care/economics , Brazil , Epidemiologic Methods , Cities , Health Personnel/organization & administration , Health Care Reform , Delivery of Health Care/economics , Resource Allocation , Health Services AccessibilityABSTRACT
Objective To evaluated the effectiveness and influence of a pay for performance incentive program on the comprehensive management in patients with type 2 diabetes. Methods The large-sample prospective study recruited 1359 eligible adult patients who were residents and had health record from three community health centers of Shanghai Jiading District. The method of randomized complete block design was used to classify the subjects into 4 groups. The physicians incentive group included 337 subjects, while the patients incentive group 338 subjects, the physicians and patients incentive group 331 subjects, the control group which the physicians and the patients would not have the incentive 353 subjects respectively. We established a cooperative pathway between community health care centers and general hospital, trained community health workers, equipped with the necessary clinical drugs, and finally, the Advance System for Diabetes Management system was used to carry out the tele-medicine. The type 2 diabetes mellitus patients, which were set goal in blood glucose and blood pressure control, managed by the general practitioners, the daily health behavior of the patients were regulated. All subjects in the patients incentive groups received the incentives if they can obtain or/and maintain the ideal level of HbA1C during the 2-years study period. The control group would not receive any incentives but would be provided with diabetes education booklet and group educational courses for diabetes mellitus control as usual. Results After 12 months and 24 months, HbA1C , systolic blood pressure, diastolic blood pressure, total cholesterol, fasting blood glucose in the four groups were all lower than baseline levels (P<0. 05), while the time of related exercise parameters and the rate of HbA1C achieving target in the study groups were higher than baseline (P<0. 05). Besides, the time of related exercise, time of moderate exercise intensity, time of strenuous exercise intensity, and the rate of HbA1C achieving target ( after 24 months:49. 0％, 53. 2％, 51. 8％, 54. 4％, P<0. 05 ) had statistical significance among the physicians incentive, the patients incentive, the physicians and patients incentive, and the control groups. Logistic regression analysis showed that the duration of diabetes, the baseline HbA1C , whether using the insulin, taking hypoglycemic drugs are the main factors of the study with statistical significance (all P<0. 05). Conclusions Based on general practitioners-specialist cooperation tele-medicine, by regulating the daily health behavior and using the intervention of pay for performance, the new diabetes care model could improve the treatment effect of type 2 diabetes to some extent, especially the exercise time and its intensity. Besides, the duration of diabetes, the baseline of HbA1C , the using of insulin and hypoglycemic drugs turned out to be the main factors of the study.
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Outpatient care services are usually the patient's first contact between the patients and the most bas-ic health care. The provision of outpatient care contributes to immediate and large gains in health status. The pay-ment method is one of the most common incentive methods applied by purchasers to guide the performance of outpa-tient care providers. This systematic review applied cochrane review method, and searched, screened, assessed and synthesized the relevant original studies. 19 studies were finally included. It was found that existing payment methods combined with P4 P interventions could probably slightly improved the health professionals' use of some tests and treat-ments ( adjusted RR median = 1 . 095 , range 1 . 01 to 1 . 17 ) , but may have led to little or no difference in patients' utilisation of health services ( adjusted RR median = 1 . 01 , range 0 . 96 to 1 . 15 ) and may have led to little or no difference in the control of blood pressure or cholesterol ( adjusted RR = 1 . 01 , range 0 . 98 to 1 . 04 ) . Pay for per-formance involves a complex design, each detail design may contain different incentive effect, therefore policy makers intend to apply pay-for-performance to guide the behavior of health providers, the design on each components of pay for performance should be analyzed in order to find more potential intervention points.
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The effort to measure and improve the quality of healthcare is a common health policy issue worldwide. Korean Value Incentive Programme is one of that effort, but some concerns exist. Compared to pay for performance program in other countries, it measures healthcare quality with relatively narrow performance domain using a small number of clinical indicators. It was designed without involving hospitals and other key stakeholder, and program participation was mandated. Highest and lowest performers get bonus and penalty using relative ranking. As a suggestion for development, the direction for quality management at the national level should be given first. Therefore the philosophy or strategy for quality improvement should be reflected to the program. And various domains and indicators of healthcare quality should be developed with active communication with healthcare providers. The evaluation method is necessary to be changed to provide achievable goal to the healthcare providers and attract quality improvement.
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Humans , Health Personnel , Health Policy , Methods , Motivation , Philosophy , Quality Improvement , Quality of Health Care , Reimbursement, IncentiveABSTRACT
O pagamento por desempenho é usado em todo o mundo para apoiar a melhoria dos processos e resultados em saúde, mas ainda há considerável lacuna de conhecimento sobre seus efeitos, especialmente pela variedade de modelos e contextos. Esta síntese de evidências usa o resultado de revisões sistemáticas para apresentar três opções para apoiar o uso de incentivos financeiros em programas e serviços de saúde: 1) adotar medidas de desempenho objetivas, simples e voltadas para o curto prazo; 2) estabelecer como base para a concessão de incentivos critérios absolutos, relativos ou mistos, fáceis de ser compreendidos e acompanhados e 3) utilizar incentivos financeiros ou de reconhecimento com magnitude adequada ao nível de motivação necessário para a mudança de pretendida. Além disso, o uso de incentivos requer a participação ativa dos sujeitos envolvidos e deve ser precedido de planejamento rigoroso apoiado pelas melhores evidências, para determinar os seguintes elementos: o agente alvo; objetivos e metas; forma de mensuração, monitoramento e avaliação dos resultados; modalidade de recompensas. Fatores institucionais e contextuais podem afetar significativamente a implementação e os resultados. O monitoramento e avaliação dos incentivos devem focar a adequação aos resultados pretendidos e a ocorrência de efeitos involuntários ou indesejados.
Payment for Performance (P4P) is widely used in the world to improvement of processes and results in health, but there is still considerable lack of knowledge about its effects, especially the variety of models and contexts. This evidence brief used results of systematic reviews to pro vide three options to support the use of P4P in health: 1) adopt performance measures objective, simple and focused on the short term; 2) establish the basis for the granting of absolute criteria incentives, relative or mixed, but easy to be understood and followed and 3) use financial incentives or recognition adequate to the level of motivation needed to change desired. In addition, the use of incentives requires the active participation of the subjects involved and should be preceded by rigorous planning supported by the best evidence to determine the following: the target agent; goals and objectives; form of measurement, monitoring and evaluation of results; type of rewards. institutional and contextual factors can significantly affect implementation and results. The monitoring and evaluation should focus on the adequacy of the intended results and the occurrence of unintended or unwanted effects.
Subject(s)
Humans , Efficiency , Delivery of Health Care , Quality Improvement , Remuneration , Health Programs and PlansABSTRACT
O Pagamento por Desempenho (P4P) é usado em todo o mundo visando à melhoria dos resultados em saúde, e no Brasil é base do Programa Nacional de Melhoria do Acesso e da Qualidade (PMAQ), lançado pelo Ministério da Saúde, em 2011. Revisou-se a literatura publicada entre 1998 e janeiro de 2013, sobre a efetividade do P4P, para produzir resultados ou padrões de acesso e qualidade na saúde. Foram recuperados e analisados 138 estudos, sendo incluídos 41 (14 revisões sistemáticas, 7 ensaios clínicos e 20 estudos observacionais). Estudos mais rigorosos foram menos favoráveis ao P4P, enquanto estudos observacionais apontaram efeitos positivos do P4P sobre a qualidade e o acesso nos serviços de saúde. Limitações metodológicas dos estudos observacionais podem ter contribuído para tais resultados, mas a variedade de resultados está mais ligada aos aspectos conceituais e contextuais dos esquemas de P4P avaliados, reforçando a heterogeneidade de modelos e resultados do P4P. O P4P pode ser útil para promover o alcance de objetivos em sistemas de saúde, especialmente no curto prazo e para ações pontuais que exijam menos esforço dos provedores de serviços de saúde, mas deve ser utilizado com cautela e com planejamento rigoroso do modelo, considerando-se também efeitos indesejáveis ou adversos.
Pay-for-performance (P4P) has been widely used around the world seeking to improve health outcomes, and in Brazil it is the basis of the National Program for Improving Access and Quality (PMAQ). The literature published between 1998 and January 2013 that evaluated the effectiveness of P4P to produce results or patterns of access and quality in health was scrutinized. A total of 138 studies, with the inclusion of a further 41 studies (14 systematic reviews, 07 clinical trials and 20 observational studies) were retrieved and analyzed Among the more rigorous studies, favorable conclusions for P4P were less frequent, whereas observational studies were more favorable to positive effects of P4P on the quality of, and access to, health services. Methodological limitations of observational studies may have contributed to these results, but the range of results is more linked to the conceptual and contextual aspects of the use of the P4P schemes reviewed, the heterogeneity of P4P models and results. P4P can be helpful in promoting the achievement of objectives in health care systems, especially in the short term and for specific actions requiring less effort of health care providers, but should be used with caution and with a rigorous planning model, also considering undesirable or adverse effects.
Subject(s)
Humans , Reimbursement, Incentive , Health Services/economics , BrazilABSTRACT
Background Payment mechanisms for health care providers have been used as a strategy to improve management, health indicators, cost containment, equity and efficiency. Among the mechanisms implemented in the past decade is pay-for-performance (P4P). In Chile, it was incorporated since 2003 in primary care in addition to the salary by seniority and training. Objectives To assess the impact of P4P on the efficiency of primary oral health care providers in Chile. Methods We performed a retrospective cohort study to compare the performance of oral healthcare practices belonging to primary health providers measured by the rate of dental discharge in 6 year-old children between years in which P4P was used and years in which P4P was not used, in the 52 municipalities of the Metropolitan Region of Chile. We also explored whether rurality, and the human development index (HDI) had an association with the efficiency of health care teams. We calculated the rate of discharge per 1000 patients, and its adjusted and unadjusted association with the predictors of interest, using a Random-effects Poisson regression. Results We found statistically significant differences in the rate of dental discharges when comparing P4P versus no P4P (822.59/1000 and 662.59/1000, respectively, p < 0.0001) and high versus low HDI (692.23/1000 and 832.85/1000, respectively, p = 0.01). Rurality was not statistically associated with P4P (727.24/1000 in rural and 770.19/1000 in urban municipalities, p = 0.553). Unadjusted and adjusted rate ratios were very similar. Conclusions P4P financial incentives can improve the performance of primary care dental practices, and seem to be useful interventions to improve the performance of oral health care providers.
Antecedentes Se han venido utilizando mecanismos de pago a los profesionales de la atención sanitaria para mejorar la gestión, los indicadores sanitarios, la contención de costes, la equidad y la eficacia. Entre los mecanismos introducidos en el último decenio se encuentra el pago por desempeño- pay for performance (P4P). En Chile, se lleva incorporando a la atención primaria desde 2003, además del salario por antigüedad y la formación. Objetivos Evaluar el impacto del P4P sobre la eficacia de los profesionales de la atención sanitaria oral primaria en Chile. Métodos Realizamos el estudio comparativo de un grupo, para comparar el desempeño de las prácticas de los cuidados sanitarios orales de los profesionales de la salud primaria, medido mediante el índice de las altas dentales en niños de seis años, entre los años en que se utilizó el P4P y los años en que no, en cincuenta y dos municipios de la región metropolitana de Chile. También exploramos si la ruralidad y el índice de desarrollo humano (IDH) estaban asociados a la eficacia de los equipos de atención sanitaria. Calculamos el índice de altas por 1000 pacientes, y su asociación ajustada y no ajustada a los predictores del interés, utilizando el modelo de regresión de los efectos aleatorios de Poisson. Resultados Encontramos diferencias estadísticamente significativas en el índice de altas dentales al comparar P4P frente a no P4P (822,59/1000 y 662,59/1000, respectivamente, p < 0,0001), y el elevado frente al bajo IDH (692,23/1000 y 832,85/1000, respectivamente, p = 0,01). La ruralidad no estuvo estadísticamente asociada al P4P (727,24/1000 en municipios rurales y 770,19/1000 en municipios urbanos, p = 0,553). Los ratios no ajustados y ajustados fueron muy similares. Conclusiones Las incentivas financieras P4P pueden mejorar el desempeño de las prácticas de atención primaria dental, y parecen resultar unas intervenciones útiles para mejorar el desempeño de los profesionales de la atención sanitaria oral.
Subject(s)
Humans , Male , Primary Health Care , Reimbursement, Incentive , Dental Care for Children , Chile , Delivery of Health Care , Efficiency , RemunerationABSTRACT
Objective To understand the basic medical and health personnel's perception of fairness for pay for performance program .Methods This study used document analysis , expert consultation , pre-survey method to de-sign the questionnaire , and then was conducted on 367 medical and health personnel at the basic level in Zhejiang Prov-ince, analysis of variance , correlation analysis were used for statistical analysis .Results Only 0.13% of the basic medical and health personnel think pay for performance program is very fair;23.16%of people think pay for perform-ance program is fair;29.43%of people do not know whether pay for performance program is fair;34.06%of people think pay for performance program is not fair;11.99% of people think pay for performance program is very unfair . There were no significant differences between age , educational levels, working time, professional qualifications and po-sition(p>0.05).Staff in different areas of the perception of pay -for-performance fairness exists obvious difference (p<0.05).Conclusion Only a small portion of basic medical and health personnel think pay for performance pro -gram is fair, and it may directly affect the enthusiasm of staff , reduce the work quality and efficiency of basic medical and health personnel .It suggests that relevant departments should improve the pay for performance program .
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With the support of World Bank ( WB ) and UK Department for International Development ( DFID) , China Rural Health Project ( hereinafter referred as Health XI Project) began to introduce the idea of performance management to 40 counties in 8 provinces in 2008 . The project implemented cyclic performance manage-ment strategies, including performance planning, performance communication, performance evaluation and perform-ance improvement. With the continuous improvement of performance as the goal, the project attempted to establish incentive mechanisms based on the performance of health care services. After five years of pilots in 40 counties, it has achieved good results in the aspects of improving the quality and efficiency of health care services, motivating the enthusiasm of health care managers and workers, etc. Moreover, it has successfully built several advanced counties with exemplary performance management and accumulated some experience, which provides reference and demonstra-tion for implementing performance management in other areas. The key experiences of implementing performance management of rural primary health care include taking health care quality as the core of performance, appropriately combining economic and non-economic incentives, encouraging personnel participation in performance management in order to ensure the sustainability of performance improvement, and effectively applying the ideology of systematic per-formance management in order to effectively enhance the management level of hospitals. The paper also puts forward some policy suggestions based on emerging issues during implementation of performance management.
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In the past decade, pay-for-performance (P4P) programs in the health care sector have been im-plemented throughout the world. These programs differ in their design, as they have different targets ( hospitals or physicians) and different performance sectors incentivised. P4P has also been introduced to Chinese hospitals re-cently. This article reviews major P4P initiatives (programs of the U. K. , U. S. , France, etc. ) and collects common design factors for analysis ( targets, quality measures, incentive schemes, performance benchmarks, etc. ) . The pros and cons of each design factor are discussed, and some inevitable empirical pitfalls are also reviewed. It is anticipa-ted that such international experiences can provide possible future reference for the Chinese hospital remuneration re-form.
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Objective:To analyze the pay for performance related costs and provide suggestions for further stud-y. Methods:Empirical literatures from inside the country and overseas were collected with a systematic review. Costs were summarized on the basis of three drivers ( performance appraisal, performance improvement and incentive per-formance) . Results:A total of 141 papers, 47 in Chinese and 94 in English were enrolled. Most papers in Chinese were subjected on healthcare facilities while the English ones emphasized on hospitals. Pay for performance may lead to the healthcare service costs, regulation costs and the resources allocation related costs reduction. In addition to these visible costs, a large amount of others hidden from different hospital management levels were also due to pay for performance. Conclusions:(1) Differences in costs could be found from home and overseas experience which per-haps resulted from the pay for performance, the supporting measures and the policy development. (2) More attention should be paid to the quantification researches on the health facilities’ hidden costs. (3) Most available researches fo-cus on pay for performance cost-effectiveness from the society and service purchase but not the providers’ perspective and the hidden costs were also ignored.
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Performance-based incentives (PBIs) aim to counteract weak providers’ performance in health systems of many developing countries by providing rewards that are directly linked to better health outcomes for mothers and their newborns. Translating funding into better health requires many actions by a large number of people. The actions span from community to the national level. While different forms of PBIs are being implemented in a number of countries to improve health outcomes, there has not been a systematic review of the evidence of their impact on the health of mothers and newborns. This paper analyzes and synthesizes the available evidence from published studies on the impact of supply-side PBIs on the quantity and quality of health services for mothers and newborns. This paper reviews evidence from published and grey literature that spans PBI for public-sector facilities, PBI in social insurance reforms, and PBI in NGO contracting. Some initiatives focus on safe deliveries, and others reward a broader package of results that include deliveries. The Evidence Review Team that focused on supply-side incentives for the US Government Evidence Summit on Enhancing Provision and Use of Maternal Health Services through Financial Incentives, reviewed published research reports and papers and added studies from additional grey literature that were deemed relevant. After collecting and reviewing 17 documents, nine studies were included in this review, three of which used before-after designs; four included comparison or control groups; one applied econometric methods to a five-year time series; and one reported results from a large-scale impact evaluation with randomly-assigned intervention and control facilities. The available evidence suggests that incentives that reward providers for institutional deliveries result in an increase in the number of institutional deliveries. There is some evidence that the content of antenatal care can improve with PBI. We found no direct evidence on the impact of PBI on neonatal health services or on mortality of mothers and newborns, although intention of the study was not to document impact on mortality. A number of studies describe approaches to rewarding quality as well as increases in the quantities of services provided, although how quality is defined and monitored is not always clear. Because incentives exist in all health systems, considering how to align the incentives of the many health workers and their supervisors so that they focus efforts on achieving health goals for mothers and newborns is critical if the health system is to perform more effectively and efficiently. A wide range of PBI models is being developed and tested, and there is still much to learn about what works best. Future studies should include a larger focus on rewarding quality and measuring its impact. Finally, more qualitative research to better understand PBI implementation and how various incentive models function in different settings is needed to help practitioners refine and improve their programmes.
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Desde os anos 50, os fatores de risco para as doenças cardiovasculares passaram a ser valorizados. O gerenciamento de doenças cardiovasculares (PGC) busca a construção da autonomia e melhoria da qualidade de vida dos pacientes. Em alguns países, para alcançar esses objetivos, tem sido apontada a utilização de programas de pagamento por desempenho (PPP) aos médicos como um dos elementos de melhoria nos processos e nos resultados dos pacientes e na condição de remuneração. O objetivo deste estudo é analisar o ponto de vista dos médicos sobre a implantação dos pagamentos por desempenho vinculados ao PGC em uma operadora de plano de saúde. Trata-se de investigação de caráter qualitativo, do tipo estudo de caso, apresentando entrevistas semiestruturadas com médicos participantes ou não do PGC, em setembro de 2009, tendo como referência as ações implantadas em 2008. Foram entrevistados 23 médicos (14 homens e 09 mulheres). Como resultado foi observado que o incentivo financeiro é reconhecido pelos médicos como importante, mas não determinante da inclusão de pacientes no PGC. O principal motivo apresentado foi a organização do cuidado, no qual o paciente é mais bem acompanhado e controlado, e o trabalho médico, avaliado segundo parâmetros preestabelecidos. O PGC e o PPP têm potencial de transformação do cuidado em saúde. O trabalho multidisciplinar e a maior produtividade nos atendimentos no consultório foram os principais efeitos positivos identificados. Outros estudos são necessários para acompanhar a evolução e os efeitos do pagamento por desempenho no trabalho médico.
Since the '50s, people began to give increasing value to the risk factors for cardiovascular disease. The management of cardiovascular disease (CMP) seeks the construction of patient autonomy and improved quality of life. In some countries, to reach these goals, the use of pay-per-performance (PPP) to physicians has been mentioned as one of the elements of improvement in the process, in patient outcomes and in remuneration conditions. Our goal is to study the medical perspective of the implementation of performance payment linked to the CMP. This is a qualitative research, a case study, using semi-structured interviews with PGC participating and non-participating doctors. The interviews were conducted in September 2009, based on the actions implemented in 2008. We interviewed 23 doctors (14 men and 9 women). The main reason cited for the inclusion of CMP patients was the organization of their care, in which the patient is well controlled and monitored and medical work is evaluated by pre-established parameters. The financial incentive is recognized as important but not determining of the inclusion of patients. The CMP and the PPP have the potential to transform health care, improving outcome indicators. Multidisciplinary work and increased productivity in appointments in the practice were the main positive effects identified. Further studies are required to observe the progress and effects of performance payment.
Subject(s)
Humans , Health Human Resource Evaluation , Physician Incentive Plans/trends , Fee-for-Service Plans/trends , Supplemental Health , Case Reports , Qualitative ResearchABSTRACT
The challenge facing the Korean National Health Insurance includes what to spend money on in order to elevate the 'value for money.' This article reviewed the changing issues associated with quality of care in the Korean health insurance system and envisioned a picture of an effective pay-for-performance (P4P) system in Korea taking into consideration quality of care and P4P systems in other countries. A review was made of existing systematic reviews and a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development survey. An effective P4P in Korea was envisioned as containing three features: measures, basis for reward, and reward. The first priority is to develop proper measures for both efficiency and quality. For further improvement of quality indicators, an electronic system for patient history records should be built in the near future. A change in the level or the relative ranking seems more desirable than using absolute level alone for incentives. To stimulate medium- and small-scale hospitals to join the program in the next phase, it is suggested that the scope of application be expanded and the level of incentives adjusted. High-quality indicators of clinical care quality should be mapped out by combining information from medical claims and information from patient registries.
Subject(s)
National Health Programs , Program Development , Quality Improvement/economics , Quality of Health Care/economics , Reimbursement, Incentive/organization & administration , Republic of KoreaABSTRACT
We conducted a systematic review to summarize providers' attitudes toward pay-for-performance (P4P), focusing on their general attitudes, the effects of P4P, their favorable design and implementation methods, and concerns. An electronic search was performed in PubMed and Scopus using selected keywords including P4P. Two reviewers screened target articles using titles and abstract review and then read the full version of the screened articles for the final selections. In addition, one reference of screened articles and one unpublished report were also included. Therefore, 14 articles were included in this study. Healthcare providers' attitudes on P4P were summarized in two ways. First, we gathered their general attitudes and opinions regarding the effects of P4P. Second, we rearranged their opinions regarding desirable P4P design and implementation methods, as well as their concerns. This study showed the possibility that some healthcare providers still have a low level of awareness about P4P and might prefer voluntary participation in P4P. In addition, they felt that adequate quality indicators and additional support for implementation of P4P would be needed. Most healthcare providers also had serious concerns that P4P would induce unintended consequences. In order to conduct successful implementation of P4P, purchaser should make more efforts such as increasing providers' level of awareness about P4P, providing technical and educational support, reducing their burden, developing a cooperative relationship with providers, developing more accurate quality measures, and minimizing the unintended consequences.
Subject(s)
Humans , Attitude of Health Personnel , Program Development , Quality Improvement/economics , Quality of Health Care/economics , Reimbursement, Incentive/organization & administration , Republic of KoreaABSTRACT
A 'estratégia dos bônus' é definida como a prática, por parte dos empregadores, de procurar fazer com que os empregados trabalhem mais e melhor usando como incentivo a concessão de vantagens monetárias adicionais ao salário, condicionadas ao aumento de produtividade. Dois exemplos da estratégia são mencionados, um deles referente à Secretaria da Educação do Estado de São Paulo, outro à Universidade de São Paulo. Examinam-se a seguir três pressupostos da estratégia a concepção penosa do trabalho, o trabalhador imbuído do espírito do capitalismo e a recompensa monetária como única forma de incentivo procurando-se mostrar que nenhum deles tem validade universal, sendo portanto estritamente falsos. Apresentam-se a seguir evidências adicionais para a invalidade dos pressupostos, oriundas do trabalho de professores aposentados, ou que já têm condições de se aposentar, mas continuam na ativa. Na última seção é exposta a consequência mais nefasta do uso da estratégia dos bônus: a 'idiotização' da sociedade.
The 'bonus strategy' is defined by employers as a way to seek to make the workers work more and better using grants for additional monetary benefits to wages as an incentive, conditional on an increase in productivity. Two examples of the strategy are mentioned, one of them referring to the Department of Education of the State of São Paulo and the other to the University of São Paulo (USP). It examines the following three assumptions of the strategy the conception of painful labor, workers imbued with the spirit of capitalism, and monetary reward as the only form of incentive in an attempt to show that none of them have universal validity and are therefore strictly false. Then we present the additional evidence for the invalidity of the assumptions, derived from the work of retired teachers and teachers who have the credentials to retire, but that are still working. In the last section, the most disastrous consequence of the use of the bonus strategy is exposed: the 'idiotization' of society.